Introduction
Over the last 23 years of generalized floating, the United States has periodically bought and sold foreign reserves in an effort to influence exchange rates. Economists have questioned the efficacy of U.S. intervention because the Federal Reserve System routinely sterilizes its impact on the monetary base. Although the process of sterilizing intervention alters the currency composition of outstanding government securities, thereby offering a second possible channel of influence, studies provide no compelling evidence of significant portfolio-adjustment effects (see Edison [1993] ).
Instead, empirical research generally finds neither strong nor consistent correlations between official interventions and changes in either exchange rates, exchange-rate risk premia, or measures of exchange-rate volatility. 1 Results usually are not robust across time periods, currencies, or model specifications, suggesting that success might depend solely on the ability of intervention to affect market expectations.
Most economists regard exchange markets as highly efficient, but information is costly, and some interval must pass between the receipt of new information and its full incorporation into foreign exchange quotations. That monetary authorities might sometimes possess an information advantage seems possible, but whether they do so routinely and can regularly exploit this advantage in pursuit of exchange-rate objectives is questionable.
As a means of studying the expectations channel, this paper estimates the conditional and unconditional probabilities with which U.S. intervention might smooth exchange-rate movements. A high probability of success implies that intervention regularly affects expectations that underpin foreign exchange quotes. Conditioning these probabilities indicates which aspects of intervention increase the chances of success. My sample includes official U.S. intervention data at a daily frequency from February 1987 to February 1990 . This was a period of frequent and heavy U.S.
intervention--often conducted in concert with Germany and Japan--to stabilize dollar exchange rates "at current levels" (see Funabashi [1988] ).
Section I defines success in terms of a smoothing criterion, counts the number of successful interventions, and compares that count to the expected number of successes based on a binomial distribution. The approach adopted here avoids ambiguities inherent in regression analysis. In a regression of exchange-rate changes on intervention, for example, a positive coefficient may imply a perverse response--foreign exchange purchases (sales) cause dollar appreciations (depreciations)--or it may imply that intervention smoothes exchange-rate movements without reversing them. 2 In section I, I find that with one exception (U.S. purchases of German marks), the probability of observing a greater number of successes than actually occurred is relatively small, suggesting that intervention affects exchange rates.
Section II asks whether various techniques for intervention improve the chances of success. I model the conditional probability of success using the logistic probability distribution and conditioning variables suggested by other studies. The results indicate that central banks can significantly increase the odds of success by coordinating their interventions. The dollar amount of intervention is also significant, but it is of secondary importance to coordination. Other conditioning variables, notably the oftmentioned distinction between reported and unreported intervention, seem unimportant (see Dominguez and Frankel [1993] ). Section III derives conditional probabilities of success from estimated logit models, and the final section concludes with some policy implications.
An appendix describes the use of censored regression techniques employed in constructing reaction functions for intervention. The predicted values from these functions serve as instruments for intervention in the logit models. Failure to account for the joint determination of exchange-rate changes and intervention can bias parameter estimates.
I. Smoothing Exchange-Rate Movements
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as agent for both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), intervenes to "counter disorderly markets." 3 In practice, Treasury and Federal Reserve officials determine market disorder subjectively, relying on a mutable set of macroeconomic and financial criteria (see Smith and Madigan [1988] ). As a result, notions of success are similarly inconstant and subjective, and unlike the criterion presented below, may not bear a one-to-one relationship with individual interventions. This paper defines success in terms of smoothing exchange-rate movements.
This criterion is compatible with many definitions of calming market disorder and with the G7's Louvre objective of stabilizing dollar exchange rates "at current levels."
Moreover, empirical estimates of intervention reaction functions report evidence of a smoothing objective (see Almekinders and Eijffinger [1991, 1992] and Edison [1993] Goodhart and Hesse [1993] ).
The intervention data do not include purchases and sales that the Federal Reserve undertakes for official customers and with no intent to influence exchange rates (see Adams and Henderson [1983] ).
As expression (1) indicates, w t equals one--implying success--if intervention sales (purchases) of foreign exchange are associated with a dollar appreciation (depreciation) on day t (DS t ), or if they are associated with a smaller dollar depreciation (appreciation) when comparing DS t with DSAM t . 4
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York undertakes nearly all of its intervention in the U.S. market. During our sample period, every intervention was against German marks or Japanese yen. Table 1 presents summary statistics for these interventions. interventions against Japanese yen successfully smoothed exchange-rate movements.
Sales of marks or yen were more frequently successful than purchases of these currencies.
I want to determine, however, if the number of successes is large, since a high number of successes could result from the natural martingale behavior of spot exchange rates even if intervention were ineffective. Under a martingale process, day-to-day exchange-rate changes have an expected value of zero, with equal probability of appreciation or depreciation. Consequently, having observed a depreciation on day t, the probability of finding a smaller depreciation on day t+1 is greater than 50 percent. Column #6, however, suggests that the probability of randomly observing a greater number of successes than was actually found is fairly low in every case except that of U.S. purchases of German marks. 6 An underlying assumption in these calculations is that smoothing movements in exchange rates are independent events. A substantial body of evidence suggests that exchange rates follow a martingale process with heteroskedastic error terms. 7 The summary data in table 3 confirm this pattern for our sample. Martingales do some damage to the assumption of independent trials, but the offending temporal dependence appears only in higher moments of the exchange-rate process. Moreover, official intervention could create persistence in the variance. The statistic for biasness in our sample (m 3 ) is sometimes significant, but its significance often seems sensitive to whether the sample includes intervention. (The restricted sample in table 3 excludes interventions.) The significant kurtosis (m 4 ) in our sample is consistent with GARCH effects and a martingale process. 6 The differences between U.S. intervention against German marks and Japanese yen could result from the fact that U.S. intervention was often coordinated with Germany and Japan over this period, and because Japanese intervention was associated with innovations in money growth, which markets might then anticipate (see Watanabe [1994] ). Germany usually tends to sterilize (see Neumann and von Hagen [1991] ).
7 A martingale process implies that the expected exchange-rate change is zero and that the probability of an appreciation or depreciation is equal (i.e., exchange-rate changes are not biased). A martingale process also implies that exchange-rate changes are not serially correlated, but unlike the random-walk hypothesis, it does not require exchangerate changes to be independent and identically distributed. Exchange-rate changes typically exhibit extreme kurtosis. Baillie and McMahon (1989) provide a detailed discussion of the statistical properties of exchange-rate changes.
As a further test, I calculate the probability of observing an individual success, $ p 2 , as the frequency of observing smoothing in 1,000 replications of artificial randomwalk exchange-rate processes. I construct the series using the calculated second moments for the German mark and Japanese yen exchange rates. Each replication consists of 616 observations for the mark and 625 observations for the yen.
Using the $ p 2 's (table 2, column #5), one might expect to observe 22 successful U.S. sales of German marks, 67 successful U.S. purchases of German marks, 40
successful sales of Japanese yen, and 44 successful purchases of Japanese yen even if the Federal Reserve acted randomly and if intervention were completely ineffective.
Column #7, however, shows that the probability of randomly observing a greater number of successes than was actually found is less that 5 percent in every case except that of U.S. purchases of German marks.
These results confirm the earlier finding: Successful intervention is not a random event attributable to the martingale nature of exchange rates. U.S. intervention appears to affect information important to the pricing of foreign exchange.
II. The Odds of Successful Intervention
The United States might improve its chances for success by conducting intervention in a specific manner or by associating it with other events. I model the conditional probability of success using the logistic cumulative density function:
where w i n i ( = 1,..., ) is the dichotomous success variable described in expression (1). 8 I hypothesize that success is a linear function of explanatory variables: . I estimate the logit model only over observations containing intervention.
where X i is a (1 ´ K) vector of variables that influence the probability that intervention will be successful, and b is a (K ´ 1) column vector of parameters.
The logit function is the log of the odds ratio, which I estimate using maximumlikelihood techniques:
where $ P i is the estimated relative frequency of observing w i = 1 in n trials, and where Judge et al. [1988] , pp. 788-95).
Included in the conditioning vectors are those variables frequently suggested in the literature as influencing the likelihood of successful intervention. Before presenting the estimates, I discuss the conditioning variables.
Dollar Amount of Intervention
Within the context of the portfolio-adjustment theory of exchange-rate determination, the amount of an intervention seems crucial, since the exchange-rate response is a function of the relative change in outstanding government debt. Within the context of an expectations channel, the importance of the amount of intervention is unclear. Large interventions need not have a substantially greater effect on market expectations than small interventions. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York often undertakes interventions with many commercial banks at different times during the day.
At any point during the day, individual traders, while aware that the Fed is in the market, may be unaware of the total amounts. Indicative of this, amounts reported in news accounts of intervention are often vague or incorrect (see Osterberg and Wetmore Humes [1993] ).
Three measurements attempt to assess the importance of the amount of intervention. First, I consider the absolute value of the dollar amount of U.S. 
intervention against German marks (ING) and Japanese yen (INJ

Special Factors Affecting Expectations
Empirical investigations by Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1990) suggest that coordinated central-bank intervention significantly affects exchange rates more often than does uncoordinated intervention. Coordinated intervention could affect expectations more profoundly than unilateral actions if it shows agreement among central banks about the nature of the information in the market.
Accordingly, the dummy variables, CORDG and CORDJ, equal one, respectively, when the United States and Germany, and the United States and Japan, intervene in concert. I constructed CORDG from official German intervention data, and CORDJ from published references to Japanese intervention. 9 The sample includes 114 coordinated interventions with Germany and 102 coordinated interventions with Japan.
Intervention often occurs over a string of days, with long intermittent periods of no intervention. Humpage (1988) found that the first intervention in a string was more apt to be significantly correlated with exchange-rate changes than were the subsequent interventions in a series. Subsequent interventions may not provide new information.
As a further check, I tested a dummy variable, FRST, that equals one when U.S.
intervention against a specific currency is the first in the past five business days.
The New York Fed's Foreign Exchange Desk can intervene directly with commercial banks, or it can operate through the broker's market. The latter method affords the System anonymity; the former does not. 10 Dominguez and Frankel (1993) contend that known intervention--proxied by newspaper accounts--affects exchange rates more often and more strongly than does secret intervention. Hung (1992) disagrees, saying that the importance of anonymity depends on the nature of the information. Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993) question the accuracy of news accounts.
I consider three dummy variables that measure reported interventions: 1) RI equals one when The Wall Street Journal reports any intervention activity against the dollar whatsoever, 2) RIA equals one when The Wall Street Journal specifically refers to U.S. intervention, and 3) REPINT is the dummy variable for reported intervention found in Dominguez and Frankel (1993) .
Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve routinely sterilizes U.S. intervention in the sense of not allowing an intervention to interfere with the attainment of its reserve or federal funds rate targets. Nevertheless, unexpected changes in monetary policies can affect exchange rates, and interventions that coincide with them will appear more successful than they otherwise would.
During the sample period, the FOMC set its federal funds rate target (FTAR) to be consistent with the degree of reserve pressure that it desired at a particular time.
10 When the Federal Reserve deals directly with a commercial bank, that bank is free to announce that the Fed is in the market. When the Fed enters the broker's market, it gets a commercial bank to act as its agent. The broker knows and reveals only the identities of the commercial banks that are party to the transactions. The agent bank must keep the Fed's transaction secret.
Often, the FOMC altered FTAR in a policy move to affect the markets, but sometimes it adjusted the target in response to gradual shifts in underlying market pressures.
Generally, following Sellon (1994) 
Other Events
Just as contemporaneous changes in monetary policy may result in successful intervention, coincidental reports of other events might increase the chances for success. 11 Sellon equates every $100 million change in the nonborrowed reserve path to a 25-basis-point change in the effective funds rate target, and allows changes in the discount rate to lead to an equal change in the effective funds rate target (see Sellon [1994] , pp. 12-13).
We include the dummy variables CPI, EMP, BOT, and GNP, which equal one, respectively, on the release days for consumer prices, the unemployment rate, the monthly balance of trade, and quarterly GNP. We also include UXCPI, UXEMP, UXBOT, and UXGNP, which measure differences between the actual and the expected values of these economic indicators on their release dates. The expected values are the median expectations from the Money Market Services surveys of expectations. NEWS, also from Dominguez and Frankel (1993) , is a catch-all dummy variable for other policy events that might provide information to the market. interventions against Japanese yen) present the results from estimating the logit function with each of the explanatory variables included separately. The odds that U.S.
Results
intervention will successfully smooth exchange-rate movements significantly increase with the amount of intervention (after adjusting for simultaneity) and when intervention is coordinated. For U.S. intervention against German marks, IHATG is significant at the 95 percent confidence level, and CORDG is significant at the 90 percent interval. For U.S. intervention against Japanese yen, IHATJ is significant at the 90 percent confidence level, and CORDJ is significant at the 95 percent level. None of the other explanatory variables seems to affect the odds ratio significantly.
We next consider the joint significance of the explanatory variables (tables 6 and 7) by adding combinations of other variables to CORDG and CORDJ. The first row of 
III. Conditional Probabilities of Success
Rearranging equation (4) gives the conditional probability of success as Table 8 shows estimates of the conditional probability of success for U.S.
intervention against German marks. The first column presents estimates of the conditional probabilities when equation (5) By coordinating its intervention against German marks with the Bundesbank, the United States increases the probability of success from 0.524 to 0.686. Coordination seems crucial, given that we expect to observe random smoothing, as a result of the 12 Collinearity between the intervention terms and the coordination dummies is not a problem for U.S. intervention against German marks or Japanese yen. Neither term is significant in a regression (OLS or logit, as required) of one on the other. Table 8 presents conditional probabilities evaluated at the mean value of IHATG and for the mean plus or minus one standard deviation. The amount of an intervention seems to increase the probability of success above what one might expect to observe randomly only when it is also coordinated, or when it is uncoordinated but very large (mean plus one standard deviation). At one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of success is 73 percent in the absence of coordination. The final column of table 8 presents the change in the probability of success (evaluated at the mean) for a marginal change in IHATG. The effect is minuscule. Table 9 shows estimates of the conditional probability of success for U.S.
intervention against Japanese yen. The first column presents estimates of the conditional probabilities when equation (5) Even at one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of success is only 64 percent in the absence of coordination. The final column of table 9 presents the change in the probability of success (evaluated at the mean) given a marginal change in IHATJ.
The effect is very small and independent of coordination.
IV. Conclusions
Most economists accept that U.S. monetary authorities may sometimes possess an information advantage over the foreign exchange market, but question whether they can use it to pursue an exchange-rate objective. My results suggest that U.S.
intervention frequently conveys information important to the pricing of foreign exchange. Over the sample period, I find that the observed number of successful interventions usually are greater than one would expect to uncover under a martingale exchange-rate process, if interventions were ineffectual and random.
Coordinating intervention significantly increases the chances of success. Other things equal, uncoordinated intervention has only about a 50 percent chance of being successful. The size of an intervention also affects its probability of success, but coordination is generally a better predictor. Interventions typically must approximate one standard deviation above their mean value to affect success in the absence of coordination, but central banks can achieve a similar probability of success at a much lower dollar amount of intervention through coordination. Other distinctions, such as between reported and unreported intervention or between first and subsequent interventions, have no impact on the likelihood of success.
Two policy recommendations stem from these findings: 1) Central banks should coordinate their interventions, and 2) Maintaining a large portfolio of foreign exchange to facilitate frequent and large interventions seems unnecessary. In the rows marked sales: S 1 is the number of appreciations in DS t plus the number of smaller depreciations when comparing DS t with DSAM t , for all observations excluding interventions. In the rows marked purchases: S 1 is the number of depreciations in DS t plus the number of smaller appreciations when comparing DS t with DSAM t , for all observations excluding interventions. #5: $ p 2 is the average frequency of observing smoothing in 1,000 replications of an artificial random-walk process, using the first and second moments for either the German mark or Japanese yen (see table 3 ). Each replication consists of 616 observations for the mark and 625 observations for the yen. Smoothing is as defined in #4.
#6: Probability of observing a greater number of successes than was actually observed (column #2) in a sample equal to the number of interventions (column #1), using $ p 1 as the probability of an individual success. #7: Probability of observing a greater number of successes than was actually observed (column #2) in a sample equal to the number of interventions (column #1), using $ p 2 as the probability of an individual success. Notes: 1. Number of appreciations for DS. 2. Number of depreciations for DS. 3. Number of appreciations for DS plus smaller depreciations when comparing DS with DSAM. 4. Number of depreciations for DS plus smaller appreciations when comparing DS with DSAM. 5. Box-Pierce Portmanteau Test for autocorrelation in exchange-rate changes with 10 lags. Not applicable to the restricted samples. 6. Box-Pierce Portmanteau Test for autocorrelation in squared exchange-rate changes with 10 lags as preliminary test for GARCH. Not applicable to the restricted samples. 7. ∆SAM for the Japanese yen contains a single significant autocorrelation at lag 6. 1. Sample period extends from 2/18/87 to 2/23/90 and includes n = 144 interventions, of which W = 92 were successful according to expression (1).
2. Likelihood-ratio test compares the log likelihood function with all variables to the log likelihood with only the constant. 1. Sample period extends from 2/18/87 to 2/23/90 and includes n = 135 interventions, of which W = 101 were successful according to expression (1).
2. Likelihood-ratio test compares the log likelihood function with all variables to the log likelihood with only the constant.
3. Likelihood ratio tests the significance of adding a variable to that/those listed at the top of each block. * significant at the 95 percent confidence level. ** significant at the 90 percent confidence level. (III) Derivative of the logistic cumulative density function with respect to IHATG, evaluated using the equation in (II). (III) Derivative of the logistic cumulative density function with respect to IHATJ, evaluated using the equation in (II).
Appendix: Central-Bank Reaction Function
Empirical studies of intervention must confront the simultaneous nature of intervention and exchange-rate changes. Researchers, using high-frequency data, often opt for lagging intervention one period; however, this may create a specification bias.
To deal with the simultaneity problem, I estimate a U.S. intervention reaction function and generate the predicted values as instruments for intervention.
Specification
Intervention to smooth exchange-rate movements could take a continuum of values, depending on the size of day-to-day exchange-rate movements. Instead, one observes episodic interventions only under certain market conditions that occur at discrete intervals. That is, intervention data are incidentally truncated. To construct an unbiased reaction function, I 1) estimate a probit model for the decision to intervene and calculate the inverse Mills ratio, and 2) estimate a separate equation for the amount of intervention, using the inverse Mills ratio to correct for sample selection bias (see Greene [1993], pp. 706-714 The bracketed term on the right-hand side of the final expression in (A3) is the Mills ratio. This term is derived from the conditional probability theorem. φ( ) ⋅ is the normal density function, and Φ( ) ⋅ is the cumulative normal density function.
Estimation
A least squares regression of (A2) produces inconsistent estimates of the parameters in g . Introducing the Mills ratio takes account of the sample selection bias.
The selection variable Z* is not observed; we know only that intervention has taken place (Z*>0) or has not taken place (Z*=0). Because Z* has no scale, we must also assume that σ u = 1. The two-step procedure described in Heckman (1979) gives consistent estimates of the parameters in (A3), but a maximum-likelihood technique offers more efficient estimates than does the Heckman procedure.
I specify separate models for U.S. intervention against German marks and Japanese yen. I describe the decision to intervene as a function of deviations from a 10-day moving average of the exchange rate, MOVAG, and a 10-day rolling standard deviation, SIG. The former captures deviations from recent trends; the latter serves as a broader measure of exchange-rate volatility (market disorder).
I depict the amount of intervention as a function of recent exchange-rate changes and the FOMC's expressed concern about dollar exchange rates. While deviations from trend and volatility may trigger intervention, the size of the most recent exchange-rate change may influence the amount of the transaction. I include DSAM t --the day-to-day change in the morning quotation--expecting large changes in this rate to trigger big interventions. I rely on D u (the variable for FOMC concern about the dollar) for identification. Furlong (1989) suggests that the order in which the FOMC specifies its policy objectives in the last paragraph of its domestic policy directive indicates that objective's relative importance to the Committee's recent monetary policy decisions. During my sample period, the specified policy objectives always consist of monetary aggregates, real economic conditions, inflation, exchange-market conditions, and domestic financial market conditions. We include a dummy variable D u that equals one between FOMC meetings at which the Committee mentioned exchange-market conditions first or second in the domestic policy directive. Table A1 presents estimates of the reaction functions for U.S. intervention against German marks and Japanese yen. All coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected sign except ρ ε µ ( , ) in the German mark model and DSAM t in the Japanese yen model. The predicted values for intervention from these estimated equations (IHATG and IHATJ) are instruments for intervention in the logit equations that appear in the body of this paper. 
